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I. INTRODUCTION
We live in a brave new world. Over the past forty years, pre-dis-
pute jury trial waivers in commercial and employment contracts have
become commonplace.1 The insertion of these clauses into leasing and
lending agreements by financial institutions has been going on for
many years.2 The insertion of such clauses in employment agree-
ments is a more recent trend. 3 Regardless of the context, the reasons
for jury waivers abound: juries are less predictable than judges;4 ju-
ries favor the "little guy" over the "big guy;"5 juries are more likely
than judges to award high damages awards; 6 trying a case to a jury is
time-consuming and inconvenient;7 and jury waivers are preferable to
mandatory arbitration clauses because arbitration proceedings are be-
coming increasingly expensive.8
In federal court civil cases, the Seventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution protects the right to trial by jury in civil actions
that existed at common law.9 If the Seventh Amendment right does
not apply to a particular civil action or its applicability is unclear, a
federal statute may nonetheless provide a jury trial right.10 In spite
of the constitutional dimension of the jury trial right in civil actions,
this right, like other constitutional rights, may be waived by prior
1. See Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Contractual Jury Waivers in Federal Civil
Cases, 92 A.L.R. FED. 688 (1989 & 2007-2008 Supp.); Jay M. Zitter, Annotation,
Contractual Jury Waivers in State Civil Cases, 42 A.L.R. 5th 53 (1996 & 2007
Supp.).
2. Zitter, supra note 1, at 53.
3. Michael H. LeRoy, Jury Revival or Jury Reviled? When Employers Are Compelled
to Waive Jury Trials, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 767, 788 (2005) (finding that the
number of court opinions on employee challenges to mandatory jury waivers is
small, but noting that the number of court opinions underestimates the preva-
lence ofjury waivers in employment contracts in that lawyers "have only recently
advised employers to use these [jury] waivers instead of arbitration").
4. Chester S. Chuang, Assigning the Burden of Proof in Contractual Jury Waiver
Challenges: How Valuable is Your Right to a Jury Trial, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 205, 209 (2006) ("From a risk management perspective ... many em-
ployers find a jury's legendary unpredictability to be unacceptable.").
5. Zitter, supra note 1, at 53; JERRY CUSTIS, LITIGATION MANAGEMENT HANDBOOK
8:32 (2004).
6. MARION G. CRAIN, PAULINE T. KIM & MICHAEL SELMI, WORK LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 1009 (2005).
7. Zitter, supra note 1, at 53.
8. CRAIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1008-1009.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. VII ("In suits at common law, where the value in controversy
shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.").
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006) (providing right to jury trial by statute in Title
VII cases where a party seeks compensatory or punitive damages).
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written agreement of the parties." Commentators have written
many articles regarding whether pre-dispute jury waivers should be
enforceable, the appropriate federal standard for determining the va-
lidity of a contractual jury waiver, which party has the burden of prov-
ing an enforceable waiver, and other related issues.12 Litigators on
both sides of the bar have spent countless hours arguing over whether
pre-dispute jury waivers are enforceable as a matter of law, and, if so,
whether the particular waiver at issue in their case is enforceable
under the law despite unequal bargaining power between the parties
or lack of conspicuousness of the waiver provision itself.13 Judges
have authored numerous opinions on these subjects. 14 Very little has
been written, however, on the procedure for raising the jury trial
waiver defense in federal court.15 Most federal courts faced with the
issue of the deadline for raising the jury waiver defense have been
content to cite the general rule that the deadline to move to strike a
jury demand is the eve of trial.16
The procedure for asserting the jury waiver defense in federal dis-
trict court should not be overlooked. Given the increasing number of
jury waiver provisions that apply to commercial and employment ar-
11. Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832 (4th Cir. 1986); K.M.C. Co. v.
Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 755-56 (6th Cir. 1985); Nat'l Equip. Rental Ltd. v.
Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F.
Supp. 2d 811, 813 (N.D. Tex. 2002). At least two state courts have held that pre-
dispute jury waivers violate state law. See Grafton Partners LP v. Superior
Court, 116 P.3d 479, 488 (Cal. 2005); Bank S., N.A. v. Howard, 444 S.E.2d 799
(Ga. 1994).
12. See supra notes 3 and 4; Dianne LaRocca, The Bench Trial: A More Beneficial
Alternative to Arbitration of Title VII Claims, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 933 (2005);
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contrac-
tual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167 (2004);
David H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Con-
fluence of Private Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Con-
trol, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085 (2002); Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding
Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16
OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669 (2001); Deborah J. Matties, Note, A Case for
Judicial Self-Restraint in Interpreting Contractual Jury Trial Waivers in Federal
Court, 65 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 431 (1997); Samuel Estreicher & Rene M. Johnson,
Contractual Jury Waivers in Federal Employment Litigation, N.Y. L. J., May 2,
2003, at 3; Stephen F. Fink, Insist on Bench Trials, NAT'L L. J., Jan. 13, 2003, at
A17.
13. See supra note 11.
14. See supra note 11.
15. See Mowbray v. Zumot, 536 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621 (D. Md. 2008) (noting that the
deadline for raising the jury waiver defense under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure arises infrequently).
16. See Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2007);
Mowbray, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 621; Bear Stearns Funding, Inc. v. Interface Group-
Nev., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82557, *9-*10 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007); Great
Earth Int'l Franchising Corp. v. Milks Dev., 311 F. Supp. 2d 419, 437-38
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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rangements, one would expect an increasing number of cases in which
a jury trial waiver defense may be asserted. Fair procedural require-
ments that are consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
need to be developed in this area in a manner that is different from
the most recent judicial decisions. It may surprise some that, accord-
ing to case law, this defense may be raised on the eve of trial or even
during a jury trial and still be timely and ultimately successful.17 In-
deed, as the courts are interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, waiver of the jury trial waiver defense through inaction during
the litigation process seems to be nearly impossible.1S
The thesis of this Article is that the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, most specifically Rule 8(c), should be interpreted to require the
jury waiver defense to be pled early on in the pretrial stage of litiga-
tion. The failure to plead the defense risks waiver. Part II of this
Article expands upon the legal issues previously raised regarding the
enforceability of a pre-dispute contractual jury waiver. Part III sum-
marizes the basic rules regarding demanding a jury trial and defend-
ing against that demand under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Part IV presents and explains the novel argument regarding the early
deadline for raising the jury waiver defense under the Federal Rules,
and establishes legal principles for determining whether the assertion
of an untimely jury waiver defense waives the defense. Part V makes
some final remarks.
II. CONTRACTUAL JURY WAIVERS
A. The Jury Waiver Explosion
Jury waivers in commercial agreements have been ubiquitous for
many years. 19 Jury waivers in employment agreements are a twenty-
first century trend.20 Prior to the passage of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, judges, not juries, acted as fact-finders in many employment dis-
crimination cases because the courts had generally interpreted Title
VII to not guarantee a jury-trial right.2 1 The 1991 Civil Rights Act
17. See supra note 16.
18. See supra note 16.
19. Zitter, supra note 1, at 53.
20. LeRoy, supra note 3, at 788. While this Article uses employment cases as an
exemplar, the ideas expressed herein relating to contractual jury waivers apply
across a broad swath of federal claims brought in federal court.
21. Fink, supra note 12, at A17. Jury trials were available prior to 1991 for claims
brought under other federal employment discrimination statutes such as the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621 (2007), and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). See BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 494-95, 696-97 (2nd ed., BNA
Books 1982). Antidiscrimination claims were also tried to juries under some
state antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g., Asare v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 1 Cal.
App. 4th 856, 868-69 (App. Ct. 1991) (right to a jury trial exists under California
[Vol. 87:675
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changed the law and guaranteed the right to jury in Title VII cases
involving compensatory or punitive damages. 22 Not surprisingly, af-
ter federal law changed to provide the right to a jury trial in Title VII
cases, the victory rate at trial for employees in employment discrimi-
nation cases increased. 2 3 Employment discrimination plaintiffs
tended to do better in front of juries than they had done in front of
federal judges in terms of liability and higher damages awards. 24
Moreover, the settlement value calculation of an employment discrim-
ination case bound for a jury trial became quite different than the
prior calculation of a case bound for a bench trial. Employers tended
to pay higher settlements to plaintiffs who had overcome a summary-
judgment motion and were destined to try their case to a jury because
of the threat-whether real or perceived-of the runaway jury.2 5
This changing dynamic in the early 1990s spurred employers to
develop alternatives to trying employment discrimination cases to ju-
ries. Many employers turned to mandatory arbitration in the 1990s as
a way to avoid the vagaries of the judicial system.2 6 Under mandatory
arbitration programs, private arbitrators, some of whom possess an
expertise in employment law, become the judges of the law and
facts. 27 From the employer's perspective, arbitration avoided the per-
ceived problems of the judicial system.28
Over the past several years, however, some of the employers who
initially adopted mandatory arbitration programs as a dispute resolu-
tion technique, to reduce litigation expenses and manage risk, have
employment discrimination statute-the Fair Employment and Housing Act,
CAL. GOVT CODE, § 12900), overruled on other grounds by Claxton v. Waters, 96
P.3d 495 (Cal. 2004).
22. Fink, supra note 12, at A17; 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006). Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (as amended), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, is the federal statute that
prohibits discrimination in employment because of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
23. Fink, supra note 12, at A17.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Cf LeRoy supra note 3, at 773 (explaining that Gilmer decision accelerated the
growth of the use of arbitrators in employment disputes in the 1990s). In the
1991 Gilmer decision, the United States Supreme Court held that a mandatory
pre-dispute arbitration agreement signed by an employee as a condition of em-
ployment was enforceable and precluded the employee from litigating his employ-
ment discrimination claim in federal district court. See Gilmer v. Interstate/
Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
27. Cf LAuRA J. COOPER, DENNIS R. NOLAN & RICHARD A. BALES, ADR IN THE WORK-
PLACE 547 (West Group 2000) (explaining that arbitrators are private, impartial
actors who resolve disputes outside the normal judicial process; almost all em-
ployment law arbitrators are attorneys and many of these arbitrators also arbi-
trate labor law disputes).
28. Cf Thomas J. Piskorski & D.B. Ross, Private Arbitration as the Exclusive Means
of Resolving Employment Disputes, 19 EMP. REL. L.J. 205, 209 (1993) (describing
the advantages of arbitration from an employer's perspective).
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found that such programs are not all they are cracked up to be. Arbi-
tration is becoming increasingly expensive and almost all of the rising
costs are borne by the employer, as opposed to the employee. 29 Lower-
ing the cost and risk to employees of bringing claims leads to more
claims.30 Arbitration procedures are becoming more "judicialized" in
terms of procedural rights like discovery and application of eviden-
tiary protections.31 The "judicialization" of arbitration proceedings
leads to greater litigation expense, which defeats one of the benefits of
arbitration. 32 Furthermore, some employers are finding that the run-
away arbitrator is out there as well.33 Only with arbitration, as op-
posed to public justice, there is typically no appellate remedy;3 4 the
employer is simply stuck with the large award. 3 5 Finally, arbitration
has proven to be controversial in that many employees believe that
such a system is inherently tilted in the employer's favor because of
the "repeat player" phenomenon, and therefore can really never be
made fair.3 6
All of this hand-wringing and disappointment over arbitration has
led some employers to turn to jury waivers as the new alternative dis-
pute resolution system. As one commentator advocated from the em-
ployer's perspective, the courts are fine; the problem is with juries.37
29. See CRAIN ET AL., supra note 6 at, 1009 ("A typical employment arbitration now
costs between $30,000 and $100,000, most of which is borne by the employer.");
Michael H. LeRoy & Peter Feuille, When Is Cost an Unlawful Barrier to Alterna-
tive Dispute Resolution? The Ever Green Tree of Mandatory Employment Arbitra-
tion, 50 UCLA L. REV. 143 (2002); Shankle v. B-G Maint., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th
Cir. 1999) (holding that a fee-splitting provision in a mandatory arbitration
agreement is unenforceable).
30. See CRAIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 1008-1009 (explaining that arbitration systems
are heavily utilized because they are low cost or costless to employees); Fink,
supra note 12, at A17 ("Anecdotal evidence suggests that lowering the cost and
risk of making claims has the the predictable effect of generating more claims.").
31. Fink, supra note 12, at A17.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants: The Overlooked Problem of Party
Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1233 n.152 (2000); Mar-
garet M. Harding, The Redefinition of Arbitration by Those with Superior Bar-
gaining Power, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857, 863 (1999); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat
Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Em-
ployment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998).
37. See Fink, supra note 12, at A17 ("There is an alternative to arbitration [jury-trial
waivers]. Courts are not the employer's problem: juries are.").
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B. Enforceability of Jury Waivers
The jury-trial right in federal civil court cases is guaranteed by the
Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 38 The United
States Supreme Court has interpreted the Seventh Amendment to
guarantee a jury trial in suits in which legal rights, as opposed to eq-
uitable rights, are asserted.3 9 The Seventh Amendment applies to
common-law causes of action and certain statutory causes of action. 40
Statutes may provide a right to jury trial either implicitly or explic-
itly.41 If congressional intent to imply the right to a jury trial does not
exist, the Seventh Amendment question must be addressed. 4 2 A his-
torical test applies. The cause of action is compared to eighteenth-
century actions brought in the English courts. The court will deter-
mine whether the modern-day action is more analogous to the legal or
equitable forms of action which existed in 1791 England.4 3 The na-
ture of the relief sought is also examined to determine whether it is
best viewed as legal or equitable.4 4 The remedies part of the test is
usually viewed as the most important part.4 5
The constitutional right to a civil jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment may nonetheless be waived by parties through a written
agreement signed prior to the dispute.46 More than general contract
law principles are utilized to determine whether such a waiver is en-
forceable, however. Because of the constitutional right at stake, the
waiver must meet a higher "knowing consent" standard. 47 The fed-
eral standard for determining the validity of a waiver is whether the
parties executed the waiver knowingly, voluntarily, and intelli-
gently.48 Whether the jury-trial right has been waived under this
38. See supra note 9.
39. Chauffeurs, Local No. 391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558, 565 (1990); Parsons v. Bedford,
28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
40. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 708-709 (1999).
41. Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577 (1978); O'CONNOR's FEDERAL RULES * CIVIL
TRIALS, ch. 5, pt. C, § 4.2, at 253 (2008) [hereinafter O'CONNOR'S].
42. City of Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 707-08; O'CONNOR'S, supra note 41, at 253.
43. Chauffeurs Local No. 391, 494 U.S. at 565; Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 42 (1989); Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 417-418 (1987); see, e.g.,
Jarod S. Gonzalez, SOX, Statutory Interpretation, and the Seventh Amendment:
Sarbanes-Oxley Act Whistleblower Claims and Jury Trials, 9 U. PA. J. LAB. &
EMP. L. 25, 51-68 (2006).
44. See supra note 43.
45. See supra note 43.
46. See supra note 11.
47. Chuang, supra note 4, at 213-15; Sternlight, supra note 12, at 677-80; Nat'l
Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 258, 258 (2d Cir. 1977).
48. Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 222 (3d Cir. 2007); Leasing
Serv. Corp. v. Crane, 804 F.2d 828, 832-33 (4th Cir. 1986); Nat'l Equip. Rental
Ltd., 565 F.2d at 258; RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811, 813
(N.D. Tex. 2002); First Union Nat'l Bank v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 2d 660,
663 (E.D. Pa. 2001); Coop. Fin. Ass'n, Inc. v. Garst, 871 F. Supp. 1168, 1171 (N.D.
2009]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:675
standard is a question of federal law for the court to decide.49 The
majority of federal courts hold that the party seeking enforcement of
the waiver has the burden to prove that the other party's consent was
made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.5O The factors gener-
ally used by the federal courts to decide whether the waiver meets this
federal standard include: the conspicuousness of the waiver provision;
the relative bargaining power between the parties; the business or
professional experience, i.e., sophistication, of the party opposing the
waiver; and whether the opposing party had the opportunity to negoti-
ate contract terms.5 1
Courts have applied these legal principles regarding the enforce-
ability of jury waivers, whether the jury waiver is signed in the com-
mercial context or the employment law context. 52 Although courts are
perhaps more searching in their analysis of jury waivers in employ-
ment agreements because of a greater likelihood of disparities in the
bargaining process, 53 jury waivers in employment agreements have
been enforced.54 Indeed, irrespective of the context, it is clear that
properly drafted jury-trial waivers may be enforceable under federal
Iowa 1995); Phoenix Leasing, Inc. v. Sure Broad., Inc., 843 F. Supp. 1379, 1384
(D. Nev. 1994), affd, 89 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Reggie Packing Co., Inc.,
671 F. Supp. 571, 573 (N.D. Ill. 1987); Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc.,
539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982).
49. See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963); GTEM, LLC v. TKN Sales, Inc.,
257 F.3d 235, 238 (2d Cir. 2001); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752,
755 (6th Cir. 1985); Morris v. McFarland Clinic, P.C., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26639, *3 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp.
2d 811, 812-13 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (stating that federal law determines the enforce-
ability of a pre-litigation contractual jury waiver).
50. The Second, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits place the burden of providing the en-
forceability of the waiver on the party seeking to enforce the waiver. See Telum,
Inc. v. E.F. Hutton Credit Corp., 859 F.2d 835, 838 (10th Cir. 1988); Leasing Ser-
vice Corp., 804 F.2d at 832-33; Nat'l Equip. Rental Ltd., 565 F.2d at 258. The
Sixth Circuit places the burden on the party objecting to the jury waiver provi-
sion. See K.M.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 758.
51. Brown v. Cushman & Wakefield, Inc., 235 F. Supp. 2d 291, 294 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
2002); RDO Fin. Servs. Co., 191 F. Supp. 2d at 813-14; First Union Nat'l Bank,
164 F. Supp. 2d at 663; Coop. Fin. Ass'n, Inc., 871 F. Supp. at 1171-72; 8 JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.52[3] [c] (3d ed. 1997) [here-
inafter 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE].
52. See Winiarski, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35799 (district court applied the legal prin-
ciples regarding "knowing consent" in contractual jury waiver in employment
agreement); Brown, 235 F. Supp. 2d at 293-95 (same).
53. See, e.g., LeRoy, supra note 3, at 796 (explaining that courts pay more attention
to the arm's length nature of the bargain in determining whether to enforce jury
waiver provisions in employment agreements than they do in deciding whether to
enforce mandatory arbitration provisions).
54. See Winiarski v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35799 (M.D. Fla.
May 1, 2008); Joseph Oat Holdings, Inc. v. RCM Digesters, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 62879 (D. N.J. Aug. 24, 2007); Morris v. McFarland Clinic, P.C., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 26639 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 29, 2004); Schappert v. Bedford, Freeman &
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law.55 Nevertheless, federal law provides ample opportunity for a
party in a particular case to argue that the applicable waiver is unen-
forceable on one or more grounds.56 Parties frequently oppose a con-
tractual jury waiver defense in litigation if the defense is raised.5 7
They are sometimes successful. There are various cases in which a
court determined that the party seeking enforcement of the waiver did
not prove a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to a jury trial
and thus the court refused to enforce the waiver. 58
III. DEMANDING A JURY TRIAL AND STRIKING A JURY
DEMAND UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. The Jury Trial Demand and Motion for Jury Trial
The jury-trial right is not self-executing. 59 Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure 38 and 39 establish the procedure for asserting the right to
a jury trial.60 Rule 38 preserves the jury-trial right as guaranteed by
Worth Publ'g Group, LLC, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14153 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2004);
Brown, 235 F. Supp. 2d 291.
55. See Landis, supra note 1 (collecting cases).
56. An inconspicuous clause that contains the jury-trial waiver, an unsophisticated
party without bargaining power, or the document signed under duress are a just
a sample of the possible arguments that could be used to defeat the enforcement
of a waiver provision. See supra note 51 (citing cases that set forth the factors
courts look at in determining whether jury waiver was made knowingly and
voluntarily).
57. See supra note 51.
58. See Nat'l Equip. Rental Ltd. v. Hendrix, 565 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1977) (incon-
spicuous waiver provision and inequality in bargaining power suggested that
waiver was not knowing); RDO Fin. Servs. Co. v. Powell, 191 F. Supp. 2d 811,
813-14 (N.D. Tex. 2002) (waiver buried deep in a lengthy paragraph and lacking
in mutuality-lender had power to demand jury-led court to find that jury
waiver was not enforceable); First Union Nat'l Bank v. United States, 164 F.
Supp. 2d 660, 665 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (gross disparity in bargaining power and lack
of opportunity to negotiate terms rendered waiver invalid); Dreiling v. Peugeot
Motors, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 402, 403 (D. Colo. 1982) (insertion of a waiver provision
at the end of a standardized form contract rendered jury waiver unenforceable); 8
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at § 38.52[3] [c].
59. 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at § 38.50[1] [a] ("The right to a jury
trial is not self enforcing. To be obtained, a jury trial must be demanded pursu-
ant to the provisions of Rule 38. Inaction results in waiver of the right."); 9
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2318, at 211 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter 9 WRIGHT & MILLER] ("The right to
jury trial preserved by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution and embod-
ied in Federal Rule 38(a) is not self-enforcing.").
60. FED. R. Civ. P. 38 (establishing the procedure for demanding a jury trial and
specifying that waiver of the jury trial occurs if that procedure is not followed);
FED. R. Civ. P. 39 (permitting the court to order a jury trial on motion of the party
who waived the right to jury trial by failing to follow the FRCP 38 procedure).
2009]
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the Seventh Amendment or a federal statute, 6 1 but provides that the
right is waived if it is not asserted by a party during the pleading
stage of litigation. 62
A party may demand a jury trial on any issue where a right to trial
by jury exists.63 The jury demand must be made by serving the oppos-
ing party with the written demand no later than ten days after the
last pleading directed to the issue is served and filing the demand
with the Clerk of Court shortly thereafter. 64 The "last pleading" will
generally be the answer or the reply to a counterclaim,65 but an
amended complaint or amended answer may extend the jury demand
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(a) ("The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution-or as provided by a federal statute-is pre-
served to the parties inviolate.").
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(d) ("A party waives a jury trial unless its demand is properly
served and filed.").
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b) ("On any issue triable of right by a jury, a party may demand
a jury trial .... ").
64. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b) ("On any issue triable of right by a jury, a party may demand
a jury trial by: (1) serving the other parties with a written demand-which may
be included in a pleading-no later than 10 days after the last pleading directed
to the issue is served; and (2) filing the demand in accordance with Rule 5(d).");
FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d)(1) ("Any paper after the complaint that is required to be
served-together with a certificate of service-must be filed within a reasonable
time after service.").
A different set of rules applies to a case removed from state court to federal
court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(3). A party who has already demanded a jury in
state court does not have to repeat the demand after the case is removed to fed-
eral court. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(3)(A). If all of the necessary pleadings have been
served in the state court case before removal but no jury demand was made in the
state-court pleadings, a jury demand must be served in the federal court case
within ten days after the filing of the notice of removal or service of the notice of
removal. FED. R. Civ. P. 81(c)(3)(B). If no jury demand was made in state court
and all of the required state court pleadings have not been made at the time of
removal, the general rule in Rule 38(b) is followed concerning the deadline for
demanding a jury trial. Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239
F.3d 1000, 1002 n.2 (9th Cir. 2001); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 2319, at
225-226 (explaining that the "the usual provisions of the Federal Rules, particu-
larly Rule 38(b) . . . govern the time in which to demand a jury" if not all of the
necessary pleadings have been served in the state court proceeding prior to re-
moval). In states where the applicable state law does not require an express jury
demand, a "party need not make one after removal unless the court orders the
parties to do so within a specified time." FED. R. Crv. P. 81(c)(3)(A).
65. See In re Tex. Gen. Petroleum Corp., 52 F.3d 1330, 1339 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The last
pleading in Rule 38 usually means an answer or a reply to a counterclaim.");
McCarthy v. Bronson, 906 F.2d 835, 840 (2d Cir. 1990), affd, 500 U.S. 136 (1991)
("'[Tihe last pleading directed to an issue is not the pleading that raises the issue,
it is the pleading that contests the issue. Normally, that pleading is an answer,
or, with a respect to a counterclaim, a reply."); 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 51, at § 38.5013] [b] ("The 'last pleading' within the meaning of the
rules generally will be an answer or reply, and is determined on a case-by-case
basis.").
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time-period if that amended pleading raises new jury trial issues.66 In
the majority of cases, a jury demand is timely if served within ten days
after the last defendant's answer to the complaint. 6 7 The jury demand
may be included in a pleading, such as endorsing "Jury Trial De-
manded" on the plaintiffs original complaint, or made as a stand-
alone document. 6 8 Waiver of the right to a jury trial occurs if the jury
demand is not made within the ten-day period under the rule.6 9 The
ten-day provision provides a sufficient amount of time for counsel to
determine whether a jury-trial right exists in the case and, if it does,
whether it is strategically beneficial to assert the right by making a
jury demand.70
66. See Shelton v. Consumer Prods. Safety Comm'n, 277 F.3d 998, 1011 (8th Cir.
2002); Huff v. Dobbins, Fraker, Tennant, Joy & Perlstein, 243 F.3d 1086, 1090
(7th Cir. 2001); 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, § 38.50[3][b]
(amended pleadings "do not extend the jury demand time, except as to issues that
are raised for the first time by the [amended] pleadings."); O'CONNOR'S, supra
note 41, ch. 5, pt. C, § 3.4, at 252 ("An amended pleading that does not introduce
new issues of fact is insufficient to renew a party's waived right to jury trial.").
67. See O'CONNOR'S, supra note 41, ch. 5, pt. C, § 3.1, at 252 (noting that "[i]n most
cases a party's jury demand is timely if served within ten days after the defen-
dant's answer to the complaint"). In cases involving multiple defendants, the
jury-demand deadline runs from the date the last defendant serves its answer.
See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at § 38.5013][b] (collecting
cases).
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b)(1); 9 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 2318, at 213-15
("Although no particular form of writing is required, and the Ljury] demand may
be 'included in a pleading,' it is desirable that the demand be either in a separate
document or set off from the main body of the pleading in order to make it readily
recognizable."); O'CONNOR'S, supra note 41, ch. 5, pt. C, § 2.1, at 250 ("The [jury]
demand may be included in the plaintiffs complaint, the defendant's answer, or a
separate document. Merely checking the jury-demand box on the civil cover
sheet is not a proper demand for a jury.").
69. The federal courts have universally interpreted Rule 38(d) according to its plain
language and ruled that the failure to satisfy the requirements of Rule 38(b)
waives the right to a jury trial. See Pac. Fisheries Corp., 239 F.3d at 1002; BCCI
Holdings (Lux.), S.A. v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 168, 172-73 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Daniel Int'l
Corp. v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 916 F.2d 1061, 1063 (5th Cir. 1990); see also 9
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 59, § 2321, at 267 ("It is well settled by a consider-
able array of cases that waiver by a failure to make a timely demand is complete
even though it was inadvertent and unintended and regardless of the explanation
or excuse.").
70. See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, § 38.50[3][b] ("The 10-day pro-
vision enables counsel to reflect on the various factors which should be considered
in deciding whether to demand a jury."). Whether a party is better suited for a
bench or jury trial in a particular case depends on many factors, which include,
but are not limited to, venue, the relative skills and reputation of the attorneys,
the complexity of the case, cost, which party has the burden of proof, the concrete-
ness of damages, and the amount of questionably admissible evidence. See WIL-
LLAM DoRSANEo, III, 7 TExAs LITIGATION GUIDE, § 113.50[21 (Aug. 2006); WILLIAM
DORSANEO, III, DAVID CRUMP, ELAINE A. CARLSON & ELIZABETH THORNBURG,
TExAS CIVIL PROCEDURE: TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE § 1.02[C], at 46-47 (4th
ed. 2001).
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Although failure to serve and file a timely jury demand waives the
right to a jury trial, the trial court has the discretion, upon a motion,
to order a jury trial under Rule 39(b).71 Therefore, a party who
desires to assert the right to a jury trial may file a motion for jury trial
after the deadline for serving and filing the jury demand has passed,
in hopes of convincing the court to order the jury trial.72 The decision
whether to grant the motion for jury trial is discretionary with the
trial court, and the appellate courts rarely overturn the trial court's
decision. 73 The federal courts often apply some variation of the follow-
ing multi-factor balancing test when deciding whether to grant the
motion for jury trial. The factors include: whether the issues are suit-
able for a jury; whether granting the motion would disrupt the sched-
ule of the court or of the adverse party; whether any prejudice would
result to the adverse party; how long the party delayed in bringing the
motion; and the reasons for failure to file a timely demand. 74
The case law from the various federal circuits demonstrates some
differences in the circuits' approaches to this issue.75 In weighing the
factors, some circuits apply a strong presumption that the motion for
jury trial should be granted.76 Other circuits tend to be sticklers for
compliance with the Federal Rules and are not apt to grant a motion
for jury trial unless exceptional circumstances excuse the delay.77 For
example, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits direct trial courts to grant
motions for jury trials unless "strong and compelling reasons to the
contrary" exist.78 In contrast, the Third Circuit courts consistently
71. FED. R. CIv. P. 39(b) ("Issues on which a jury trial is not properly demanded are
to be tried by the court. But the court may, on motion, order a jury trial on any
issue for which a jury might have been demanded.").
72. See 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at § 39.31[2] ("The language of
Rule 39(b) suggests that the filing of a formal, written motion for a jury trial is
the best procedure to follow to obtain relief from a waiver of jury trial rights
resulting from the failure to make a timely jury demand."); Hare v. H&R Indus.,
Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8661, *2 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2001) ("A party may not
insert an untimely jury demand into a case by stealth; rather, the proper proce-
dure is a motion under Rule 39(b).").
73. See 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at § 39.3113] ("As a practical
matter, regardless of what standard for the exercise of discretion is expressed,
appellate courts tend to affirm the decision of trial courts on motions for a jury
trial.").
74. See U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. The Infinity Group Co., 212 F.3d 180, 195-96
(3d Cir. 2000); Daniel Int'l Corp., 916 F.2d at 1064; Parrott v. Wilson, 707 F.2d
1262, 1267 (l1th Cir. 1983); Noddings Inv. Group, Inc. v. Kelley, 881 F. Supp.
335, 337 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
75. See O'CONNOR'S, supra note 41, ch. 5, pt. C, § 6.4, at 255.
76. See 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, § 39.3114].
77. Id.
78. See Daniel Int'l Corp., 916 F.2d at 1064 (fundamental right to jury trial under the
Seventh Amendment means the trial court should grant a motion for jury trial
under Rule 39(b) in the absence of strongly and compelling reasons to the con-
trary); Parrott, 707 F.2d at 1267 (same rule as Fifth Circuit).
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deny motions for jury trial when the reason for the failure to serve and
file a timely jury demand is due to attorney inadvertence or neglect. 79
The Ninth Circuit approach is generally in line with the Third Cir-
cuit.8 0 The Seventh Circuit stakes out a middle ground.S1
Courts vary with respect to how much weight they attribute to
each value. For some courts, making sure that a case in which a con-
stitutional or statutory right to a jury trial applies is tried to a jury is
paramount; the procedural requirements are more readily over-
looked.82 For other courts, the disregard of procedural requirements
is a big deal.83 Moreover, when a bench trial case is changed to a jury
trial case late in the pretrial process, these courts take the prejudice
that may be caused to both the opposing party and the court very
seriously.8 4
79. See U. S. Sec. and Exch. Comm., 121 F.3d at 195-96 (district court's decision to
deny untimely demand for jury trial upheld when the only reason given for the
untimely demand was attorney inadvertence and oversight); Reis v. Barley, Sny-
der, Senft & Cohen L.L.C., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26046, *7-*20 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
27, 2008); Iseley v. Talaber, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76891, *11-*14 (M.D. Pa.
Sept. 28, 2007); FSA Group, Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
23376, *1-*23 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 26, 2006); Shen Mfg. Co. v. Family Dollar Stores,
Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79820, *1-*11 (Oct. 31, 2006); In re Inacom Corp.,
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19117, *1-*15 (D. Del. Sept. 6, 2005); Vulcan Print Media,
Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24206, *1-*6 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 19, 2001).
80. See Pac. Fisheries Corp. v. HIH Cas. & Gen. Ins., Ltd., 239 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th
Cir. 2001) ("An untimely request for a jury trial must be denied unless some
cause beyond mere inadvertence is shown.").
81. See Members v. Paige, 140 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1998) ("Applications under
Rule 39(b) should be entertained with an open mind.").
82. See Daniel Int'l Corp., 916 F.2d 1061, 1064 (emphasizing that the fundamental
nature of the jury-trial right should be considered in deciding whether to grant a
motion for jury trial under Rule 39(b) and citing to statement in WRIGHT &
MILLER that denying a jury trial as a penalty for a technical violation of Rule 38 is
against the spirit of the rules).
83. This view is perhaps most eloquently stated in Bank Building & Equipment
Corp. of America v. Mack Local 677 Federal Credit Union, 87 F.R.D. 553, 555
(E.D. Pa. 1980). In the Bank Building case, Judge Troutman denied a late jury
demand for the following reasons:
To sanction [plaintiffs'] omission would invite disregard of procedural re-
quirements in all of the Rules, cause delay in disposition of disputes by
creating confusion on trial dockets and prejudice the opposing party by
injecting an unnecessary element of uncertainty into trial strategy and
preparation. Worse, the Rules' articulated purpose of securing the "just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action" would be reduced
to an empyrean principle with no practical meaning.
Id.; see also Iseley, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76891 at *14 ("A relief from waiver of
jury trial under the particular circumstances of this case would defeat the pur-
pose of Rule 38, and may encourage other litigants to disregard the procedural
requirements which seek to promote the orderly and timely progress of an
action.").
84. See United States v. Unum, Inc., 658 F.2d 300, 303 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that
granting the motion for jury trial would cause a substantial hardship because the
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B. The Motion to Strike a Jury Demand
Rule 38(b) makes clear that in the run-of-the mill cases the dead-
line for asserting a jury demand is ten days after the last defendant
files its answer to the complaint.8 5 Rule 39(b) provides an opportunity
for a jury trial to be granted by the court notwithstanding a late jury
demand.8 6 But the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are ambiguous
regarding the deadline for contesting a jury demand. Rule 39(a)(2)
states that when a jury trial is demanded on the issues in which there
is a jury-trial right, the case must be tried to a jury unless "the court,
on motion or on its own, finds that on some or all of those issues there
is no federal right to a jury trial."87 There is no specific statement in
this rule regarding the deadline for contesting the jury demand either
by an opposing party or the court.8 8
Rule 39(a)(2) certainly establishes that a party may contest a jury
demand by filing a motion.8 9 Traditionally, a party who desires to
contest a jury demand files a motion to strike the jury demand.90
There are three basic grounds upon which a jury demand may be chal-
lenged. First, a party may move to strike a jury demand because there
is no federal right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment or a
federal statute. 9 1 Second, a party may move to strike a jury demand if
the other party has forfeited the jury-trial right due to litigation con-
opposing party in preparing for a bench trial had relied on depositions and docu-
mentary evidence instead of live witnesses); Hare v. H&R Indus., 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8661, at *3 n.1 (E.D. Pa. June 26, 2001) (noting the difficulty a party
moving for a jury trial under Rule 39(b) would have in winning the motion be-
cause the opposing party would likely be prejudiced by the extra costs associated
with a jury trial and the schedule of the case would be disrupted); BCCI Holdings
(Lux.), S.A. v. Khalil, 214 F.3d 168, 172-73 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (party opposing late
jury demand argued to court that it based deposition and trial witness strategy
on reliance that case would be tried to the bench; district court denied jury trial
in part because of the prejudice that the opposing party would suffer if a jury trial
was granted late in the case); Williams v. J.F.K. Int'l Carting Co., 164 F.R.D. 340,
342 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that relief from the waiver of a jury trial under Rule
38 would cause prejudice because the parties "proceeded in discovery for ten
months with the understanding that the case would be tried before the Court.").
85. See supra note 67.
86. See supra note 71.
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2) ("When jury trial has been demanded under Rule 38, the
action must be designated on the docket as a jury action. The trial on all issues
so demanded must be by jury unless: ... (2) the court, on motion or on its own,
finds that on some or all of those issues there is no federal right to a jury trial.").
88. Id.
89. Id. ("The trial on all issues so demanded must be by jury unless: ... (2) the court,
on motion or on its own, finds that on some or all of those issues there is no
federal right to a jury trial.") (emphasis added).
90. 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at § 39.13[2] [b]; O'CoNNoR's, supra
note 41, ch. 5, pt. C, § 5, at 254; Akin v. PAFEC, Ltd., 991 F.2d 1550, 1555 (11th
Cir. 1993).
91. O'CoNNOR'S, supra note 41, ch. 5, pt. C, § 5.4, at 254-55.
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duct. For example, a party may move to strike a jury demand when
the opposing party's jury demand is untimely or was never served on
the parties. 92 A party may also move to strike a jury demand when a
written stipulation for a bench trial signed by the parties to the litiga-
tion preceded the jury demand.9 3 Finally, a party may move to strike
a jury demand if the parties have agreed to a pre-dispute contractual
jury-trial waiver.9 4
Although Rule 39(a)(2) does not establish a deadline for the filing
of a motion to strike the jury demand, the prevailing view is that,
whatever the ground to strike the jury demand, parties may wait until
the eve of trial to move to strike a jury demand. 95 Indeed, courts sub-
scribing to this view have granted motions to strike a jury demand
filed a week before trial and on the very eve of trial.96 Courts often
reason that, because Rule 39(a)(2) gives a trial court the power to act
on its own initiative to strike a jury demand, a court has the discretion
to permit a motion to strike a jury demand at any time during pretrial
proceedings, even on the eve of trial.97 The federal courts have ruled
that the "eve of trial" deadline applies to a motion to strike a jury de-
mand based on a pre-dispute contractual jury waiver. 98
Some courts take it a step further and rule that it is not too late for
the court or an opposing party to contest a jury demand during the
actual jury trial itself. In this line of cases, appellate courts have per-
mitted trial courts to switch from a jury trial to a bench trial during
the actual jury trial when a party or judge points out, after the jury
92. Id.
93. Id.; FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(1) ("The trial on all issues so demanded must be by jury
unless: (1) the parties or their attorneys file a stipulation to a nonjury trial or so
stipulate on the record.").
94. O'CONNOR'S, supra note 41, ch. 5, pt. C, § 5.4, at 255.
95. See 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at § 39.13[2] [c] ("Parties have a
great latitude on the timing of motions to strike a jury demand. Because a court
has the power act to sua sponte at any time, it follows that a court has the discre-
tion to permit a motion to strike a jury demand at any time, even on the eve of
trial."); Tracinda Corp. v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 502 F.3d 212, 226-27 (3d Cir.
2007) (adopting MOORE's rational and permitting motion to strike jury demand);
Mowbray v. Zumont, 536 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621 (D. Md. 2008) (same); Bear Stearns
Funding, Inc. v. Interface Group-Nev., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82557, *9-*10
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2007) (same); E.E.O.C. v. Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 571 F. Supp.
535, 535-36 (D. N.J. 1982) (same).
96. United States v. Schoenborn, 860 F.2d 1448, 1455 (8th Cir. 1988) (trial court
granted motion to strike jury demand filed one week prior to trial); Armco, Inc. v.
Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 1158 (5th Cir. 1982) (court takes case
away from jury based on motion to strike jury demand filed on eve of trial); Jones-
Hailey v. Corp. of Tenn. Valley Auth., 660 F. Supp. 551, 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1987)
(motion to strike jury demand filed one month before trial is timely because Rule
39(a) does not specify a time limit for filing a motion to strike jury demand).
97. See supra note 95.
98. See Tracinda Corp., 502 F.3d at 226-27; Mowbray, 536 F. Supp. 2d at 621; Bear
Stearns, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82557 at *9-*10.
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trial has commenced, that the claims are equitable claims and hence
not jury claims. 99 As a procedural matter in these cases, the trial
judge makes the jury advisory pursuant to Rule 39(c), which provides
for advisory juries where a party does not have the right to a jury
trial.oo Other appellate courts have rejected this action. In Hilde-
brand v. Board of Trustees of Michigan State University, for example,
the Sixth Circuit reasoned that principles of fundamental fairness and
judicial economy militate against permitting a trial court to abort a
jury trial due to a lack of a jury-trial right during the jury trial and
convert the proceedings into a bench trial.1O1
Whether most federal courts would permit a party or the trial
court to contest a jury demand during the jury trial itself is uncertain,
yet it appears that the federal courts that have considered the issue
have ruled that a motion to strike a jury demand may be filed at any
time prior to the start of trial. 10 2 As explained below, the adopted rule
that a contractual jury waiver challenge may be raised at any time
prior to trial is not grounded in the text of Rule 39(a). The federal
courts have not adequately explained the bases for this adopted rule.
It is conceivable that this rule is a carryover from either pre-1938
practice in federal court or from common practice in state courts.
However, the federal courts have not articulated pre-1938 practice as
a justification for the rule.1o 3
IV. WAIVER OF THE JURY WAIVER DEFENSE UNDER THE
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Flaws in the Current Law
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 39(a)(2) simply states that "[t]he
trial on all Uury] issues so demanded must be by jury unless the court,
on motion or on its own, finds that on some or all of those issues there
is no federal right to a jury trial."10 4 As previously explained, many
federal courts have reasoned, in line with Moore's Federal Practice,
that "because a court has the power to act sua sponte at any time, it
follows that a court has the discretion to permit a motion strike a jury
99, See Ed Peters Jewelry Co. v. C & J Jewelry Co., 215 F.3d 182, 186-88 (1st Cir.
2000); Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir.
1994).
100, See supra note 99; FED. R. CIv. P. 39(c) ("In an action not triable of right by ajury,
the court, on motion or on its own: (1) may try any issue with an advisory jury; or
(2) may, with the parties' consent, try any issue by a jury whose verdict has the
same effect as if a jury trial had been a matter of right, unless the action is
against the United States and a federal statute provides for a nonjury trial.").
101. 607 F.2d 705, 710 (6th Cir. 1979) (converting from a jury trial to a bench trial
may prejudice one side over the other).
102. See supra notes 96-98.
103. See supra note 95.
104. FED. R. CIv. P. 39(a)(2).
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demand at any time, even on the eve of trial."105 This reasoning is
flawed. Rule 39(a)(2) clearly states that a party may move to contest a
jury demand on the ground that there is no federal right to a jury trial
or that a court on its own initiative may strike a jury demand because
there is no federal right to a jury trial.106 The statement from the rule
that a court may act sua sponte-on its own initiative-to strike a
jury demand does not necessarily imply that the court may act sua
sponte to do this at any time during the case. The rule does not state
that a court may act sua sponte at any time.10 7 One would expect this
sort of additional language if the drafters intended to permit a court to
raise a jury-demand challenge at any time during the litigation. For
example, it is black-letter law that a challenge to a federal court's sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction may be raised by the court at any time during
litigation-even after trial and the entry ofjudgment-but this princi-
ple is reflected in Rule 12(h)(3), which clearly states that a court may
raise the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time.10 8 The most
one can say about Rule 39(a)(2) is that it permits a party and the court
to move to strike a jury demand, but does not make clear the deadline
for a party to file a motion to strike or for the court to strike the jury
demand on its own initiative. The rule is unclear about whether a
party or the court must adhere to any deadline at all.
This begs the question: Why did the drafters of Rule 39 choose not
to establish a firm deadline to file a motion to strike a jury demand?
The current versions of Rules 38 and 39 are largely unchanged from
the original 1937 versions of these rules.10 9 There is no discussion of
the original drafters' reasoning behind the decision not to provide a
motion to strike a jury demand deadline in the 1937 Advisory Com-
105. 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at § 39.1312][c]; see supra notes
95-96.
106. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2).
107. Id.
108. Prior to the 2007 stylistic changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
12(h)(3) stated that "[w]henever it appears by suggestion of the parties or other-
wise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss
the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (pre-December 1, 2007 version) (emphasis
added). Rule 12(h)(3) currently states: "[i]f the court determines at any time that
it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action." FED. R.
Crv. P. 12(h)(3) (post-December 1, 2007 version) (emphasis added). See also
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 506 (2006) (citing to Rule 12(h)(3) for the
proposition that the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in federal court "may be
raised by a party, or by a court on its own initiative, at any stage of the litigation,
even after the trial and entry of judgment"); Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 455
(2004) (same); Frett-Smith v. Vanterpool, 511 F.3d 396, 398 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007)
(same).
109. Rule 38 was amended in 1966, 1987, 1993, and 2007. Rule 39 was amended in
2007. None of the amendments address moving to strike a jury demand by a
party or striking a jury demand on the court's own initiative. See 8 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, at §§ 38App.100, 39App.01-.02.
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mittee Notes to Rules 38 and 39.110 Accordingly, interested observers
are left to speculate as to the thoughts underlying the Advisory Com-
mittee's decision.
There are several possible policy reasons that could explain the
failure to establish a deadline. First, the Advisory Committee mem-
bers may have believed that setting a firm deadline would not be a
good idea because determining whether a jury-trial right does exist
under the Seventh Amendment is a complicated issue and one that
may be difficult to determine by simply looking at the pleadings."'
Under this view, due to the complicated Seventh Amendment analy-
sis, a party might need considerable time to evaluate whether the
jury-trial right exists, and thus, a firm deadline, especially a deadline
fairly early in the pretrial process, would hamstring a party's ability
to contest what detailed research may reveal is an improper jury de-
mand. Second, the Committee members may have deemed a deadline
imprudent because the jury-trial right may change during the course
of the litigation as parties and claims are added and subtracted. The
changing nature of the jury-trial right-a jury demand that is proper
when originally made because the demand is based on a legal issue in
the case could later become lost as a matter of right due to the subse-
quent dismissal of that legal issue if the remaining issues in the case
are equitable-counseled against the establishment of a firm deadline
for moving to strike a jury demand.112 Finally, the Committee mem-
bers may have considered that motions to strike jury demands would
be filed to contest untimely jury demands and that setting a deadline
to contest an untimely jury demand would be difficult given the differ-
ences in particular cases in terms of the amount of lateness of a partic-
ular jury demand.
Looking at this issue in hindsight, the possible reasons for failing
to establish a firm deadline for a party to move to strike a jury de-
mand are not entirely convincing. First, if there is a concern that it
takes a long time to discern whether or not a federal right to a jury
trial exists, why does the party making the jury demand have to make
this determination early on in the pleading stage by serving and filing
110. See Advisory Committee on Rules for Civil Procedure Note of 1937 to Rules 38
and 39, 75th Congress, 3d Session, House Document No. 588 (Feb. 1938); see also
8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 51, §§ 38App.01[2], 39App.01[2].
111. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
1102-1120 (Erwin Chermerinsky et al. eds., Aspen Publishers, Inc. 3d ed. 2002);
Merex A.G. v. Fairchild Weston Sys., Inc., 29 F.3d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Given
the minimal strictures of federal pleading, it will sometimes not be clear until
well into the trial whether an issue is equitable or legal.").
112. See Armco, Inc. v. Armco Burglar Alarm Co., 693 F.2d 1155, 158 (5th Cir. 1982)
(trial court appropriately took case away from jury and ruled on the equitable
claim when the court had previously dismissed the legal claim upon which the
jury demand was based prior to the start of trial).
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a jury demand?l i 3 If the amount of time it may take to evaluate the
substantive right to a jury trial is truly a concern, the deadline for
filing a jury demand would not be during the pleading stage. Moreo-
ver, this argument, even if convincing, favors establishing a motion-to-
strike-jury-demand deadline that is later on in the pretrial litigation
stage, but does not favor establishing no deadline at all. Second, a
caveat to any deadline could be devised to take into account jury de-
mands that are proper when originally made but later become im-
proper due to dismissed claims. Finally, a timing problem regarding
contesting untimely jury demands is a red herring. If a party fails to
make a jury demand in a timely manner, it must file a motion for jury
trial. The opposing party has the opportunity to contest the jury de-
mand in a response to the motion for jury trial or could file its own
motion to strike at the same time. Thus, this timing issue could also
be addressed by an exception.
From a policy perspective, the development of the law in this area
is troubling. Although, at the very least, there is ambiguity regarding
the timing of a motion to strike a jury demand, the legal authorities
have coalesced around the idea that a motion to strike a jury demand
is timely if filed at any time before trial.ii 4 A motion to strike a jury
demand filed a week or even a day before trial is timely. 1 15 A motion
to strike a jury demand during the trial may also be timely if the case
has not yet been submitted to the jury.1 1 6 In short, there is not much
of a time limit on filing the motion to strike a jury demand.
B. Limiting Rule 39 to its Text
The current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be interpreted
to require a contractual jury waiver challenge to a jury demand to be
raised early on in the pretrial process. Rule 39(a) should be limited to
its text.
The original 1937 version of Rule 39(a)(2) stated that issues on
which a jury demand has been asserted shall be tried to a jury unless
"the court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial
by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist under the Constitu-
tion or statutes of the United States."117 After the stylistic changes to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective December 1, 2007, the
current version of Rule 39(a)(2) states that a trial on all issues in
113. See supra Part III.A.
114. See supra notes 96-98.
115. See supra notes 96-98.
116. See supra notes 99-101.
117. See R. Crv. P. FOR THE DIST. CTS. OF THE U.S. (adopted by the Supreme Court
pursuant to the 1934 Rules Enabling Act) (on file with author); Letter of Submit-
tal from the Chief Justice of the United States to the Attorney General of the
United States (December 20, 1937) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
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which a jury demand has been asserted shall be tried to a jury unless
"the court, on motion or on its own, finds that on some or all of those
issues there is no federal right to a jury trial."118
Assume for the sake of argument that the prevailing view, which
holds that a motion to strike a jury demand filed at any time-even on
the eve of trial-is timely, is the correct interpretation of Rule
39(a)(2), and is sound policy."l 9 By its very terms, this time limit only
applies to motions to strike jury demands that challenge the substan-
tive right to a jury trial. 120 The original Rule 39(a)(2) speaks of a chal-
lenge to a jury demand based on a jury right not existing under the
Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or federal statutes. As the
stylistically-changed but substantively-unaltered 2007 version
phrases the point, the basis for the motion to strike the jury demand
under the rule is whether a federal right to a jury trial exists.121
Neither the original version nor the stylistic modification refer to
waiver defenses-motions to strike jury demands based on waiver of
the jury right due to litigation conduct or waiver based on a pre-dis-
pute written agreement. The waiver questions are separate and apart
from whether a jury trial right exists under the Seventh Amendment
or a federal statute. Therefore, in establishing the procedural mecha-
nisms and timings for contesting jury demands on these grounds, Rule
39 does not serve as a constraint.
The idea that Rule 39(a) does not specifically apply to contractual
jury waivers is a novel concept. No federal court has yet made this
distinction. One litigant has argued that distinction to no avail.
118. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(a)(2) (emphasis added).
119. One could argue that there are sound reasons for a rule that allows challenges to
jury demands, based on the absence of a right to a jury trial under the Seventh
Amendment or a federal statute, to be raised very late in the pretrial process.
The challenge to the substantive right to the jury trial under federal law is decid-
edly different from a challenge to a waiver of that jury-trial right under federal
law. This difference may implicate concerns that could properly lead to separate
timing rules for these different challenges. For example, one might assert that
the former challenges bear more of a resemblance to subject matter jurisdiction,
and thus, these claims should be allowed to be raised later in the process. This
Article does not stake out a position on this separate question. It focuses only on
the timing question as it relates to a pre-dispute contractual jury waiver
challenge.
120. See supra notes 117-118 and accompanying text.
121. The 2007 changes were not meant to alter the substance of Rule 39(a). See FED.
R. Civ. P. 39 (2007) (notes of the Advisory Committee) ("The language of Rule 39
has been amended as part of the general restyling of the Civil Rules to make
them more easily understood and to make style and terminology consistent
throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only."); see also
FED. R. Civ. P. 1 13 (2007) (notes of the Advisory Committee) ("Other Changes.
The style changes to the rules are intended to make no changes in substantive
meaning."). Rule 39 was not one of the rules that contained a minor technical
amendment that could arguably change meaning. Id.
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Without any real attempt to address the argument, the federal district
court dismissed it out of hand. 122 Although the argument is a novel
one, it is a straightforward interpretation of the plain language of the
rule. The acceptance of this distinction would allow the adoption of a
different approach under the Federal Rules-an approach that best
serves the important public policy considerations of promoting fair-
ness and judicial economy. The last part of this Article focuses solely
on establishing different procedural rules for raising a pre-dispute
contractual jury waiver defense.123
C. A Different Procedural Approach to the Jury Waiver
Defense
Once the shackles of Rule 39 are released from the contractual jury
waiver defense, other rules of civil procedure may be applied to de-
velop the proper procedural mechanism for raising and litigating a
contractual jury waiver defense to a jury demand. The overriding
goals in developing this new procedural mechanism for raising and
litigating a contractual jury waiver defense are to promote fairness
and convenience, apply probability, and prevent surprise. Fortu-
nately, these goals are accomplished by characterizing a challenge to a
122. Mowbray v. Zumot, 536 F. Supp. 2d 617, 621-22 (D. Md. 2008).
123. As a practical matter, the time limit on motions to strike based on waiver of the
jury right due to litigation conduct should not pose that many problems. Courts
will need to remain flexible regarding the time limit. In general, waiver of the
jury right due to litigation conduct encompasses two types of challenges. First,
the motion to strike the jury demand is filed on the ground that the other party
did not file a timely jury demand. Second, the motion to strike the jury demand is
filed on the ground that the parties stipulated to a bench trial during the litiga-
tion and prior to the filing of the jury demand. With regard to the first challenge,
the timeframe to make this sort of challenge is fairly intuitive. The party oppos-
ing a jury demand on the ground that the jury demand is untimely should raise
the challenge shortly after the other party files the untimely demand or the mo-
tion for jury trial. In actuality, the burden is on the party filing the untimely jury
demand to prove that its waiver should be excused. If Rule 38 is carefully fol-
lowed, this party must use the motion for jury trial as the procedural means of
proving excuse from its waiver. The party contesting the untimely waiver may
make its challenge in a response to that motion or may file its own motion to
strike but it does not bear any burden. The time for conducting the challenge
should be fairly apparent. There would be no need to raise this type of challenge
in a pleading. With regard to the second challenge, the motion to strike the jury
demand would be filed shortly after the jury demand.
The nature of these challenges is that they are not raised unless a party slept
on its rights or stipulated to a bench trial earlier in the litigation process. The
challenges are raised at the time the jury demand right is asserted. Courts
should be willing to let parties raise these types of challenges, if such challenges
are required, within a considerable amount of time after the right to a jury trial is
asserted based on the individual factual circumstances and equities of the partic-
ular case, which may include permitting such challenges on the eve of trial or
during trial.
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jury demand on the ground that a pre-dispute contractual agreement
waived the right to a jury trial as a "matter of avoidance or affirmative
defense" under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c).
The effect of this characterization is that the contractual jury
waiver defense must be pled and proven by the party who raises it.
Thus, a contractual jury waiver challenge must be asserted in the ini-
tial responsive pleading or an amended pleading. A motion to strike
the jury demand based on the pled contractual jury waiver defense
may follow at any time prior to the non-dispositive motion deadline
established by the court. The failure to plead the affirmative defense
of a contractual jury waiver at the pleading stage of the litigation
leads to the risk that the defense will be waived, just like the failure to
plead other affirmative defenses and matters in avoidance. Yet, con-
sistent with the principles permitting the raising of affirmative de-
fenses in amended pleadings and motions under the Federal Rules, it
is possible that an untimely pled contractual waiver defense will still
be allowed.
The benefit of this approach is two-fold. First, this approach, as
opposed to the current approach under Rule 39, forces the party who
raises a contractual jury waiver defense in response to a jury demand
to do so at the pleading stage of the litigation. The pleading require-
ment promotes fairness to the parties, promotes judicial economy, and
prevents surprise. Second, this approach also permits untimely con-
tractual jury waiver defenses to be permitted by courts in certain cir-
cumstances, just like courts may permit untimely jury demands in
certain circumstances. Thus, there is symmetry in the law between
untimely jury demands and untimely contractual jury waiver de-
fenses. The end result of this approach is that it will be very unlikely
that contractual jury waiver challenges made on the eve of trial will be
permitted by the courts. This approach contrasts with the current ap-
proach, which assumes such challenges late in the pretrial process are
timely.
1. The Jury Waiver Defense as an Affirmative Defense Under
Rule 8(c)
Rule 8(c) enumerates nineteen affirmative defenses or avoidances
that must be pled in a responsive pleading or waiver of those defenses
is risked.124 It also creates a catch-all category for other affirmative
124. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (2006). Prior to the 2007 stylistic changes Rule 8(c) read: "In
pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively accord and
satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory negligence,
discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegal-
ity, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, stat-
ute of frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense." Id. (emphasis added).
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defenses or matters of avoidance that are not listed in the rule, but
still must be pled in a responsive pleading. 12 5 The contractual jury
waiver is an affirmative defense or avoidance under Rule 8(c) for two
reasons.
First, waiver is specifically listed as one of the nineteen affirmative
defenses in the Rule. 126 The commonly accepted definition of waiver
is "the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment-express or im-
plied-of a legal right or advantage."12 7 A pre-dispute contractual
jury waiver fits this bill. A party knows it has a right to a jury trial
under the Seventh Amendment or a federal statute and intentionally
gives that right up in exchange for consideration.
Second, the contractual jury waiver defense is a matter of avoid-
ance under the catch-all category for policy reasons. One may plausi-
bly, though not persuasively, attack the textual argument that a
contractual jury waiver defense to a jury demand is not a waiver
under Rule 8(c) because an avoidance or affirmative defense is limited
to a defensive allegation that admits the allegations of the complaint,
but suggests some other reason why there is no right of recovery on
the substantive civil claim.128 In other words, the affirmative defense
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1) (2007). The post-2007 Rule 8(c)(1), which incorporated
the stylistic change, read: "In responding to a pleading, a party must affirma-
tively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: accord and satisfac-
tion; arbitration and award; assumption of risk; contributory negligence;
discharge in bankruptcy; duress; estoppel; failure of consideration; fraud; illegal-
ity; injury by fellow servant; laches; license; payment; release; res judicata; stat-
ute of frauds; statute of limitations; and waiver." Id. (emphasis added).
125. The text of the rule establishes that the list of nineteen affirmative defenses is
not exhaustive. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (2006) ("In pleading to a preceding pleading,
a party shall set forth affirmatively ... and any other matter constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense.") (emphasis added). FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1)
(2007) ("In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoid-
ance or affirmative defense, including: . . .") (emphasis added). Commentators
have noted that the list of affirmative defenses and avoidances in Rule 8(c) is not
exhaustive and that other affirmative defenses and avoidances must be pleaded
as well. They have also noted that the scope of this part of Rule 8(c) is not en-
tirely clear. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 8.08[5] (3d. ed. 1997) [hereinafter 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE]; 5 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
§ 1271, at 581-85 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter 5 WRIGHT & MILLER].
126. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1); see supra note 124; see also Barwell & Hays, Inc. v. Sloan,
564 F.2d 254, 255 (8th Cir. 1977) (waiver is an affirmative defense that must be
affirmatively pleaded under Rule 8(c)); Bard v. Mark Steven CVS, Inc., 378 F.
Supp. 2d 33, 40 (D.R.I. 2005) (waiver is an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c)).
127. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1611 (8th ed. 2004); see also Dominex, Inc. v. Key, 456
So. 2d 1047, 1058 (Ala. 1984); Brown v. City of Pittsburgh, 186 A.2d 399, 401 (Pa.
1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 84 cmt. b (1979).
128. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 125, § 1271, at 585 (an affirmative defense or
matter of avoidance under Rule 8(c) encompasses a defensive allegation that ad-
mits the allegations of the complaint but suggests some other reason why there is
no right of recovery); 2 Roy W. McDONALD, TEXAs CIVIL PRACTICE IN DISTRICT
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of waiver under Rule 8(c) concerns the types of actions in which an
entire claim, or at least the issues that relate to the substantive claim,
is waived. Under this view, a contractual jury waiver challenge is not
an allegation that defeats the right of recovery on the substantive civil
claim; it simply defeats a procedural right-the right to a jury trial on
a claim. The jury waiver defense has nothing to do with the claim
itself and therefore is not covered by Rule 8(c). Indeed, the classic af-
firmative defenses-like statute of limitations, res judicata, and stat-
ute of frauds-each cut off the right of recovery on the substantive
claim.129 The better view, however, is that the concept of what consti-
tutes an affirmative defense or matter of avoidance under Rule 8(c) is
not limited to defenses that address the underlying substantive
claim.130
Professors Wright and Miller state that affirmative defenses or
matters in avoidance may also encompass defensive allegations that
address offensive allegations made by the plaintiff that are outside of
the plaintiffs prima facie case. 13 1 A jury demand made by a plaintiff
is an offensive allegation that is outside of the plaintiffs prima facie
case-the substantive right to recover on his or her claim-and thus a
challenge by the defendant to that jury demand via a contractual jury
waiver goes to an allegation that is outside of the plaintiffs prima fa-
cie case. Accordingly, under this view, the contractual jury waiver de-
fense is a matter of avoidance under Rule 8(c).
Equally as important, commentators and courts have written
about how determining whether something constitutes a matter of
avoidance or affirmative defense is at its core a policy question. 132
AND COUNTY COURTS §7.34.1, at 220 (Frank Elliott ed., Callaghan & Co. 1982)
("Affirmative defenses, when taken in isolation from other parts of the answer,
usually are considered as accepting the existence at one time of a prima facie case
and as asserting propositions which, if established, will defeat the claim.").
129. See Day v. Moscow, 955 F.2d 807, 811 (2d Cir. 1992) (false arrest claim barred by
res judicata); Grant v. Preferred Research, Inc., 885 F.2d 795, 799 (11th Cir.
1989) (fraud claim barred by the statute of limitations); Treasure Valley Gastro-
enterology Specialists, P.A. v. Woods, 20 P.3d 21, 25 (Idaho Ct. App. 2001) (oral
employment agreement rendered unenforceable by the Statute of Frauds).
130. See Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 96
(4th Cir. 1996) (stating that an arbitration agreement defense-which does not
cut off a substantive claim-should be pleaded as an affirmative defense under
Rule 8(c)).
131. See 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 125, § 1271, at 585 ("Generally speaking,
[Rule 8(c)'s] reference to 'an avoidance or affirmative defense' encompasses ...
defensive allegations . . . that concern allegations outside the of the plaintiffs
prima facie case that the defendant therefore cannot raise by a simple denial in
the answer.").
132. See Ingraham v. United States, 808 F.2d 1075, 1078-1079 (5th Cir. 1987) (policy
questions-like whether the matter should be indulged or disfavored-are perti-
nent "[to] whether a given defense is 'affirmative' within the ambit of Rule 8(c)");
LG Phillips LCD Co. v. Tatung Co., 243 F.R.D. 133, 136 (D. Del. 2007) (to deter-
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Professors Wright and Miller have noted some "working principles"
for determining whether a party is required to plead a particular de-
fense under Rule 8(c). These principles include: controlling precedent;
the logical inference test; and considerations of policy, fairness,
probability, and surprise.133
Concededly, federal courts to this point have not viewed the con-
tractual jury waiver defense as a matter of avoidance or affirmative
defense under 8(c).13 4 However, the other listed factors weigh in favor
of characterizing the defense in that way. Under the logical inference
test, "matters that are not part of the plaintiff's substantive case are
to be pleaded affirmatively."135 As mentioned previously, a jury de-
mand is not part of a party's substantive case. Therefore, a contrac-
tual jury waiver challenge attacks a matter that is not part of the
party's substantive case, and such a challenge is not logically inferable
from the mere assertion of a jury demand in a pleading.136
Judge Charles E. Clark, a Yale Law School Dean, Chief Judge of
United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals, and an author of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, explained that "policy" in this con-
text means that the relative favor of a defense, convenience concerns,
and the issue of surprise are all relevant inquiries. 137 For a wide vari-
mine whether a defense must be pleaded affirmatively under the Rule 8(c) "the
more helpful inquiry examines the policy and fairness considerations implicated
by the defense"); Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-SW., 851 S.W.2d 173 (Tex.
1992); JUDGE CHARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, § 96, at 609-10 (2d ed. 1947)
(disfavored defenses must be affirmatively alleged by the defendant); McDONALD,
supra note 128, at 221 ("Considerations of fairness and convenience, of the ease
or difficulty of making proof, of the comparative likelihood that a particular de-
fensive situation may exist in a reasonable proportion of the cases presented in
court, and even of handicapping disfavored contentions, have contributed to the
shaping of the concept of an 'affirmative' defense"); 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 125, § 1271, at 602 ("[iun determining what defenses other than those listed
in Rule 8(c) must be pleaded affirmatively, resort often must be had to considera-
tions of policy, fairness, and in some cases probability.").
133. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 125, § 1271, at 585-607.
134. See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
135. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 125, § 1271, at 601.
136. See, e.g., id. § 1271, at 600 (The logical inference test looks at "whether a particu-
lar issue arises by logical inference from the well-pleaded allegations in the plain-
tiffs complaint."); JOHN J. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, ARTHUR R. MILLER, &
JOHN E. SEXTON, CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 547 (7th ed. 1997) ("In
general, defendants must raise affirmatively defenses that do not flow logically
from the plaintiffs complaint.").
137. JUDGE CHARLES E. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, § 96, at 609-10 (2d ed. 1947).
[Jiust as certain disfavored allegations made by the plaintiff ... must be
set forth with the greatest particularity, so like the disfavored defenses
must be particularly alleged by the defendant. These may include such
matters as fraud, statute of frauds .... statute of limitations, truth in
slander and libel .. .and so on. In other cases, the mere convenience
may seem prominent, as in the case of payment, where the defendant
can more easily show affirmative payment at a certain time than the
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ety of reasons, the law disfavors contractual jury waivers, even though
they are enforced. 138 Moreover, it is most convenient for the party
that contests the jury demand to raise the jury waiver defense. Conse-
quently, characterizing the contractual jury waiver defense as an af-
firmative defense for this reason has some merit based on Judge
Clark's guidance.
Professors Wright and Miller contend that the notion of "fairness"
refers to whether or not most of the relevant information on a particu-
lar issue "is within the control of one party or that one party has a
unique nexus with the issue in question and therefore that party
should bear the burden of affirmatively raising the matter."13 9 Once
again, this understanding favors the advocated approach. The party
that desires to enforce a contractual jury waiver is in the best position
to affirmatively raise the issue. Particularly in jury waivers in em-
ployment cases, the employer who seeks to enforce a jury waiver may
be the only one who still has the copy of the waiver and remembers
that the employee signed it. The employee may not have known what
he or she was signing at the time, may not have kept the waiver agree-
ment, and may not even remember signing the agreement.140 Moreo-
ver, at least in most circuits, the party that seeks to enforce a jury
waiver has the burden to prove that the waiver was made knowingly,
voluntarily, and intelligently.141
As for "probability," the more the issue is an "unusual occur-
rence" 142 that departs from the legal or behavioral norm, the more
likely the law should put the burden of pleading the issue on the party
plaintiff can the negative of nonpayment over a period of time. Again it
may be an issue which may generally be used for dilatory tactics, such as
the plaintiffs right to sue ... a vital question, but one usually raised by
the defendant on technical grounds. These have been thought of as is-
sues "likely to take the opposite party by surprise," which perhaps con-
veys the general idea of fairness or the lack thereof, though there is little
real surprise where the case is well prepared in advance.
Id. Under Judge Clark's analysis, one might think of a party's right to a jury trial
as a "vital question" and the jury waiver defense as a technical defense used to
defeat that important right. If viewed this way, the jury waiver defense is again
appropriately viewed as an affirmative defense that must be pleaded.
138. Because the right to jury trial is a constitutional right, a court should indulge
"every reasonable presumption against waiver." Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301
U.S. 389, 393 (1937). In the contractual jury waiver context, the higher "knowing
consent" standard makes it more difficult to enforce contractual jury waivers
than normal contracts. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
139. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 125, § 1271, at 603.
140. See, e.g., Winiarski v. Brown & Brown, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35799, *8
(M.D. Fla. May 1, 2008) (employee challenged the enforcement of a jury trial
waiver on the ground that she did not know her employment agreement con-
tained a jury waiver).
141. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
142. F. JAMES, G. HAZARD, & J. LEUBSDORF, CMIL PROCEDURE § 3.11, at 203 (5th ed.
2001) ("The party who claims the unusual occurrence can be required to plead it
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who will benefit by establishing a deviance from the norm. 143 The le-
gal norm is that if there is a substantive right to a jury trial under
federal law and that right is properly asserted through a jury demand,
a jury trial should take place.144 A contractual jury waiver is properly
viewed as an unusual occurrence that departs from this established
legal norm. Therefore, this factor also favors characterizing the jury
waiver defense as a defense that must be pled under Rule 8(c).
Finally, the original Advisory Committee Note to Rule 8(c) states
that the drafters intentionally deleted the notion of surprise from the
Rule.145 In spite of the Advisory Committee Note, Professors Wright
and Miller take the position that "notice-giving" should be a factor in
deciding whether a certain matter should be pleaded affirmatively. 146
The federal courts have taken this position as well.147 In Garrison v.
Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, for example, a Pennsylvania
district court noted that had a defense been properly pled as an af-
firmative defense as it should have been, the plaintiff could have pur-
sued appropriate discovery procedures regarding whether the defense
was properly raised. 148 The court ruled that the raising of the affirm-
ative defense on the eve of trial by the defendant surprised and
prejudiced the plaintiff.149 Similarly, parties act differently in terms
of discovery and other pretrial preparation if the case is a jury trial
instead of a bench trial.150 The "surprise" that occurs when the con-
affirmatively so that the usual assumptions may be indulged as a matter of
course when there is no such unusual circumstance.").
143. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 125, § 1271, at 604 ("In part, the theory underly-
ing the relevance of [the probability] factor is that the burden of pleading should
be put on the party who will be benefitted by establishing a departure from the
supposed legal or behavioral norm.").
144. See, e.g., Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) ("Maintenance of the jury as
a fact-finding body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our his-
tory and jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial
should be scrutinized with the utmost care.").
145. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (1937) (Advisory Committee Note) ("This follows substantially
English Rules under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice Act, 1937) 0.19, r.
15 and N.Y.C.P.A. (1937) § 242, with 'surprise' omitted in this rule.").
146. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 125, § 1271, at 605. Judge Clark takes the same
view. JUDGE CHARLES C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING, § 96, at 609-10 (2d ed. 1947)
(affirmative defenses and matters of avoidance have been thought of as issues
that take the opposing party by surprise).
147. See Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971)
(stating that the purpose of Rule 8(c) is to provide the opposing party with notice
of the affirmative defense and the opportunity to rebut it); Brunswick Leasing
Corp. v. Wis. Cent., Ltd., 136 F.3d 521 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating that the purpose of
Rule 8(c) is to avoid surprise and undue prejudice); Red Deer v. Cherokee County,
Iowa, 183 F.R.D. 642, 652 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (notice of the defense to the plaintiff
in order to avoid surprise and undue prejudice is an important consideration).
148. 20 F.R.D. 190, 195-96 (W.D. Pa. 1957).
149. Id.
150. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
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tractual jury waiver defense is raised late in the game is another rea-
son to characterize the jury waiver defense as an affirmative defense
that must be pled. 151
Taking a bird's eye view, adopting the affirmative defense ap-
proach fits squarely within the broader historical trend toward
greater disclosure, planning, and discovery in federal civil litigation.
Since the adoption of the Federal Rules in the 1930s, there has been a
radical change in pre-trial judicial and party involvement in cases.
The affirmative defense approach furthers the goals of the modern
151. In a similar context, the federal courts have recognized that prejudice can occur
when a party delays filing a motion to compel arbitration once litigation has be-
gun. See In re Citigroup, Inc., 376 F.3d 23, 26 (1st Cir. 2004); Thyssen, Inc. v.
Calypso Shipping Corp., S.A., 310 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2002); Hoxworth v.
Blinder, Robinson & Co., 980 F.2d 912, 925 (3d Cir. 1992); Patten Grading &
Paving, Inc. v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 380 F.3d 200, 206 (4th Cir. 2004); Re-
public Ins. Co. v. PAICO Receivables, LLC, 383 F.3d 341, 346 (5th Cir. 2004); O.J.
Distrib., Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., 340 F.3d 345, 356 (6th Cir. 2003). A party
who delays in filing a motion to compel arbitration and instead decides to sub-
stantially invoke the litigation process as a means of testing out the litigation
process before making the decision on whether to try to compel arbitration risks
waiver of that arbitration right. See In re Tyco Int'l Ltd. Sec. Litig., 422 F.3d 41,
46 n.5 (1st Cir. 2005); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 134 (2d Cir.
1997).
Interestingly, like waiver, arbitration and award is listed as an affirmative
defense under Rule 8(c). The federal courts have disagreed on whether an arbi-
tration agreement fits within the concept of an affirmative defense under 8(c).
Compare Thyssen, Inc., 310 F.3d at 105-106 (affirmative defense of arbitration
and award under 8(c) refers to a situation in which an arbitrator has already
ruled and made an award in a case) with Am. Recovery Corp. v. Computerized
Thermal Imaging, Inc., 96 F.3d 88, 96 (4th Cir. 1996) (indicating that a party that
wishes to pursue arbitration based on an arbitration agreement should raise the
arbitration agreement as an affirmative defense under 8(c)). The view that an
arbitration agreement, which does not cut off a substantive claim, should be
pleaded as an affirmative defense under 8(c) strengthens the argument that a
jury waiver defense, which does not cut off a substantive claim, should also qual-
ify as an affirmative defense under 8(c). See supra Part IV.C.1.
Whether an arbitration agreement should fit within Rule 8(c) is certainly
ripe for debate, but due to the development of the case law regarding waiver of
the arbitration right through litigation conduct-waiver of that right can occur
when a motion to compel arbitration is not raised early in the litigation process-
the arbitration issue under Rule 8(c) is not as pressing as the jury waiver issue
under Rule 8(c) in that policy concerns are already reflected in the case law.
Even if 8(c) applied to the raising of the arbitration right, the perspectives, in
terms of judging whether to permit late-raised defenses are different. Because of
the strong public policy favoring arbitration, there is a strong presumption
against finding that a party waived its right to arbitration. See Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983). In contrast,
there is not a strong public policy favoring jury waivers. Accordingly, there is not
a presumption against finding that a party waived its jury waiver defense. Be-
cause the jury trial right is fundamental, the strong presumption is to protect
that right if at all possible. Thus, the jury waiver defense should be more easily
waived than the arbitration right.
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federal civil procedure system. The current approach undermines
these goals. Under the current approach-where a jury-trial waiver
challenge does not need to be raised until trial-a party may keep an
opposing party in the dark about the possibility of the jury waiver de-
fense during the discovery period. The current approach violates the
spirit of the federal discovery rules in that sorting out the merits of
the contractual jury waiver challenge depends on both parties having
access to information about the contract formation during the discov-
ery period.
In addition to furthering modern discovery principles, the affirma-
tive defense approach supports the goals of Rule 16 and judicial calen-
dar planning. Since 1938, the Federal Rules have undergone a
significant transformation in pretrial management with an aim to-
ward early resolution of issues. For example, Rule 16(a) discusses the
various purposes underlying a court's ordering of a pretrial confer-
ence, which include expediting disposition of the action, discouraging
wasteful pretrial activities, improving the quality of the trial through
more thorough preparation, and facilitating settlement. These articu-
lated reasons for pretrial judicial management coincide with the rea-
sons for adopting an affirmative defense approach to contractual jury
waiver challenges. Furthermore, this approach would reduce the
costs for both the court and litigants with respect to the preparation of
jury instructions and other jury-oriented trial tasks. It could also af-
fect how a judge would rule on motions in limine.152
2. The Affirmative Defense Effect
Treating the contractual jury waiver defense as an affirmative de-
fense or avoidance under Rule 8(c) leads to the following litigation pro-
cedure. The defense must be affirmatively pled in the first responsive
pleading after the jury demand is asserted. In many cases, this proce-
dure will work like other affirmative defenses. For example, if the
plaintiff asserts a jury demand in his original complaint, the defen-
dant must raise the contractual jury waiver defense in his original
answer. 153 If the defendant asserts a jury demand in his original an-
swer, the plaintiff must raise the contractual jury waiver defense in
an answer to the jury demand. 15 4 The deadlines regarding the raising
152. Sandra Sperino's insightful comments provided the basis for this "historical
trend" point.
153. FED. R. Crv. P. 8(c); In re Cumberland Farms, Inc., 284 F.3d 216, 225 (1st Cir.
2002) ("Rule 8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ... states that affirma-
tive defenses . . . must be raised in the defendant's answer to the plaintiffs
complaint.").
154. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(B) ("A party must serve an answer to a counter-
claim or crossclaim within 20 days after being served with the pleading that
states the counterclaim or crossclaim.").
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of this affirmative defense follow the normal twenty-day deadlines for
answers to complaints and answers to counterclaims. 15 5
The normal rules regarding the deadline for pleading the affirma-
tive defense of contractual jury waiver must be tweaked to accommo-
date the special circumstances regarding the jury demand deadline.
Under Rule 38, the jury demand is timely if served on the opposing
party no later than ten days after the last defendant's answer to the
complaint.156 Consequently, if a party waited until the tenth day af-
ter the last defendant's answer to serve the jury demand, the jury de-
mand would still be timely.157 This scenario raises the question of
when the deadline to plead the defense is. The best rule is that the
opposing party must raise the affirmative defense of the contractual
jury waiver within twenty days after the service of the jury demand.
A twenty-day time period is preferable in this situation so that consis-
tency is maintained with the general twenty-day time period for an-
swering an original pleading. Under this view, the jury demand is
considered part of the original pleading.158
In a different circumstance, if a party asserts an untimely jury de-
mand, which should be made through a motion for jury trial,159 the
opposing party must affirmatively plead the jury waiver defense
within twenty days after service of the demand or within the deadline
established for responding to the motion. 160 This rule also maintains
consistency regarding response deadlines with the standard situation
in which a jury demand is timely filed.
155. See FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) ('A defendant must serve an answer within 20
days after being served with the summons and complaint."); FED. R. Civ. P.
12(a)(1)(B) ("A party must serve an answer to a counterclaim or crossclaim within
20 days after being served with the pleading that states the counterclaim or
crossclaim."). Under the suggested approach, a sixty-day time period would re-
place the normal twenty-day deadline when the defendant waived service of pro-
cess, the United States is the defendant, or a United States officer or employee is
the defendant. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(ii); FED. R. CIv. P. 12(a)(2); FED. R.
Cxv. P. 12(a)(3).
156. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b)(1).
157. Id.
158. An alternative approach in this situation would be to consider the jury demand as
an amended pleading, which triggers the rule that a "required response to an
amended pleading must be made... within 10 days after service of the amended
pleading." See FED. R. CIv. P. 15(a)(3); Nelson v. Adams, USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460,
466 (2000). This approach should not be followed for two reasons. First, al-
though the jury demand is being asserted after the party's original pleading, the
jury demand is timely in this scenario and does not require court permission to
serve and file. Accordingly, it is not the type of amended pleading, which re-
quires leave of court, that is contemplated by Rule 15(a)(2). Second, importing a
twenty-day time period in this scenario maintains a consistent response deadline,
which is salutary for litigants and lawyers.
159. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
160. It will typically be prudent to fully brief the contractual jury waiver defense in
response to the motion for jury trial as well pleading it as an affirmative defense.
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In a nutshell, the failure to affirmatively plead the contractual jury
waiver defense within twenty days after service of the jury demand
would generally result in the waiver of that defense. If the defense is
timely raised, the opposing party is put on notice that the waiver of
the jury right is at issue in the case and both parties may then act
according to their interests. The opposing party is put on notice that
the jury-trial right is not a given and will be able to engage in pretrial
preparation with this knowledge. In order to win on its defense, the
party that pleads the defense must, at some subsequent time, move to
strike the jury demand and brief the court on the jury waiver issue.
Generally speaking, a motion to strike the jury demand on the con-
tractual jury waiver ground would be timely if filed within the dead-
line for filing non-dispositive motions established by the court's
scheduling order, assuming that the party affirmatively pleaded the
jury waiver defense in a timely manner. 16 1
The typical exceptions to the rule that an affirmative defense is
waived if not pled should also apply to jury waiver defenses that are
not timely and affirmatively pled. In determining whether to permit
the untimely affirmative defense of contractual jury waiver, the fed-
eral courts should initially look to the authorities that have already
developed in each circuit in regards to the allowance of untimely af-
firmative defenses. Each circuit is slightly different in terms of the
test for determining whether to allow late affirmative defenses. Some
courts are more generous in allowing late affirmative defenses than
others.162 In general, however, the courts consider the amount of the
delay, the reason for the delay, and the surprise and prejudice the op-
posing party has suffered due to the failure to timely plead.163 That
being said, because the jury-trial right is such an important right,
courts should err on the side of denying late amendments for contrac-
tual jury waivers. Many courts tend to err on the side of allowing un-
timely jury demands because the jury-right is so critical to our civil
161. This procedural process is similar to situations in which a party, after pleading
some other type of affirmative defense, attempts to prove that affirmative defense
as a matter of law prior to trial. The usual rule is that a motion based on a
pleaded affirmative defense, such as a summary-judgment motion on license,
should be made by the deadline for filing dispositive and non-dispositive motions.
Cf. Jack Preston Wood: Design, Inc. v. BL Bldg. Co., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
30511, *60 (S.D. Tex. June 22, 2004) (court barred party from asserting affirma-
tive defenses of waiver, license, and fraud when these affirmative defenses were
raised for the first time three weeks after the dispositive and non-dispositive mo-
tions deadline set by the scheduling order).
162. Some courts preclude a party from raising an unpleaded affirmative defense in a
post-answer motion. Other courts are more generous and allow a party to raise
an upleaded affirmative defense for the first time in a motion to dismiss or mo-
tion for summary judgment. 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 125,
§ 8.08[2]-[31 (collecting and explaining cases).
163. Id.
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justice system. 16 4 The same principle indicates that courts should dis-
allow untimely contractual jury waivers.
While it is difficult to make generalizations about when courts
should accept an untimely amendment that adds a contractual jury
waiver defense, the following categorical approach, which addresses
the question based on timing, is a rule of thumb that courts may util-
ize. The approach is based on two fundamental assumptions. First,
the longer a party waits to plead the contractual jury waiver defense,
the greater the surprise and prejudice to the party asserting the jury
demand. A party that demands a jury trial may be prejudiced by the
other party's late contractual jury waiver defense if the former party
relies on its previously unchallenged jury demand when developing a
trial strategy. The party may, for example, tailor its descovery and
pretrial preparation for a jury trial by emphasizing live witnesses' tes-
timony over documentary evidence and deposition testimony. Second,
the longer a party waits to plead the contractual jury waiver defense,
the greater the reason to penalize the party for missing the deadline
and thereby mandate compliance with the Federal Rules.
In almost all civil cases, federal district courts establish a schedul-
ing order, which includes a deadline for amending pleadings.16 5 Prior
to this amended pleadings deadline, Rule 15(a) establishes a policy
that encourages courts to liberally grant leave to amend. 166 After the
amended pleadings deadline, Rule 16(b) establishes that "good cause"
must be demonstrated in order to allow an amendment. 16 7 For the
164. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(1) ("Except in categories of actions exempted by local rule,
the district judge-or a magistrate judge when authorized by local rule-must
issue a scheduling order . . . ."); FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(3) ("The scheduling order
must limit the time to join other parties, amend the pleadings, complete discov-
ery, and file motions."); Campania Mgmt. Co. v. Rooks, Pitts & Poust, 290 F.3d
843, 848-49 n. 1 (7th Cir. 2002) (circuit court of appeals admonished district
court for failure to include a deadline for amended pleadings in its scheduling
order and insisted that the district court delineate such a deadline in future
cases).
166. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a) (When amendment as a matter of course is not permitted "a
party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or
the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.")
(emphasis added); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (court should follow
Rule 15(a)'s admonition to grant leave freely); 3 JAMEs WM. MOORE ET AL.,
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 15.14[1] (3d. ed. 1997) [hereinafter 3 MOORE's FED-
ERAL PRACTICE] (collecting cases advocating liberal policy in favor of amending
pleadings).
167. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4) ("A schedule may be modified only for good cause and with
the judge's consent."); S&W Enter., L.L.C. v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315
F.3d 533, 535-536 (5th Cir. 2003) ("We take this opportunity to make clear that
Rule 16(b) governs amendment of pleadings after a scheduling order deadline has
expired."); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 342 (2d Cir. 2000);
In re Milk Prods. Antitrust Litig., 195 F.3d 430, 437 (8th Cir. 1999); Sosa v. Air-
print Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417, 1419 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Johnson v.
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self-evident reason of requiring compliance with federal court orders,
the courts are less likely to grant an amendment after the amended
pleadings deadline than prior to the deadline. 168 Whether a court
should permit the untimely affirmative defense of jury waiver to be
raised in an amended pleading depends on circumstances and timing.
Pursuant to the liberal amendment policy of 15(a), permitting an
amendment to add a contractual jury waiver defense prior to the
amended pleadings deadline should be routine. Courts should exhibit
less mercy when a party raises the contractual jury waiver defense
after the amended pleadings deadline but prior to the deadline for fil-
ing non-dispositive motions. In this situation, although many circuits
allow unpled affirmative defenses to be raised in non-dispositive and
dispositive motions, it should not be a given that the jury waiver de-
fense will be permitted. It should be just as likely that the defense is
denied as it is permitted. Finally, courts should not permit an unpled
contractual jury waiver defense to be raised after the non-dispositive
or dispositive motion deadlines established by the scheduling order.
Courts should adopt a per se rule that the contractual jury waiver de-
fense is not allowed if raised after this motion deadline. This will pre-
clude the contractual jury waiver defense from being successfully
raised on the eve of, and during trial.
Jury Waiver Affirmative Defense Table169
Jury Demand Jury Waiver Aff. Defense Trial Court Decision
Timely Raised Prior to Amended Routinely Permit
Pleadings Deadline
Timely Raised After Amended Maybe Permit-decision
Pleadings Deadline and depends on the factual
Prior to Non-Dispositive circumstances
Motions Deadline
Timely Raised After Non-Dispositive Disallow
or Dispositive Motions
Deadline
In short, the advocated approach requires the party who desires to
raise the contractual jury waiver defense to plead that defense during
the pleading stage and move to strike the jury demand prior to the
Mammoth Recreations, Inc., 975 F.2d 604, 610 (9th Cir. 1992); Riofrio Anda v.
Ralston Purina Co., 959 F.2d 1149, 1154-1155 (1st Cir. 1992).
168. S&W Enter., L.L.C., 315 F.3d at 535-36 (noting the importance of preserving the
integrity and purpose of the pretrial scheduling order as a reason for why Rule
16(b) governs the amendment of pleadings after the amended pleadings deadline
in the scheduling order expires).
169. This chart summarizes the categorical approach outlined in the preceding
paragraph.
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deadline for filing non-dispositive motions. The approach serves an
important notice function. It also permits regular and timely discov-
ery concerning the merits of the defense prior to the deadline for mo-
tions and then a final resolution of the merits of the defense through a
motion filed well before trial.
Admittedly, it takes some work to shoehorn the suggested limita-
tion within Rule 8. For all of the reasons elucidated in the Article, this
seems to be the best way to address this issue. Others may remain
unconvinced. Skeptics may be convinced that the current approach is
problematic, but nonetheless conclude that Rule 8 is not the proper
solution because the contractual jury waiver defense is not exactly like
the other affirmative defenses listed in Rule 8(c). There might be
other approaches for those individuals to consider. For example, one
might construct an argument under Rule 8(b) that goes something like
this: a jury trial demand is a factual allegation that the asserted claim
is not subject to a contractual jury waiver and therefore the defendant
has to respond to the factual allegation by admitting, denying, or indi-
cating a lack of information. 170 Given that jury demands are often
listed in a substantive portion of the complaint, this type of specific
denial requirement may appeal to some. Another course of action
might be to require the use of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike procedure
to raise the jury waiver.171 Rule 12(f) motions must typically be made
before the first responsive pleading.172 The notion could be that the
filing of a jury demand after a pre-dispute jury waiver is "immaterial"
or "impertinent" and thus should be stricken by a 12(f) motion.173 Fi-
nally, for those who believe that an alternative approach under the
current Federal Rules is not possible at all, constructing a new federal
civil procedure rule to address the policy concerns set forth in this Ar-
ticle could be a good solution.
These alternative approaches are not the focus of this Article.
They are mentioned, however, so that those who are not convinced
that Rule 8 provides the proper solution to this problem, but who do
believe the current approach is nevertheless misguided, will not throw
the baby out with the bathwater. At a minimum, this Article aims to
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(1)(B) ("In responding to a pleading, a party must:.., admit or
deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party."); FED. R. Civ. P.
8(b)(3) ("A party that does not intend to deny all the allegations must either spe-
cifically deny designated allegations or generally deny all except those specifi-
cally admitted.").
171. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f) ("The court may strike from a pleading an insufficient de-
fense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter. The
court may act . . .on motion made by a party either before responding to the
pleading or, if a response is not allowed, within 20 days after being served with
the pleading.").
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(f).
173. See id.; E.E.O.C. v. Lipton, 571 F. Supp. 535 n.1 (D. N.J. 1982) (arguing that
motion to strike a jury demand was untimely because it did not follow Rule 12(f)).
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encourage discussion of this issue amongst scholars, judges, and prac-
titioners, which hopefully will lead to further research and exploration
of the issue by interested parties in the legal community. An ap-
proach that requires a party to raise the jury waiver defense early in
the litigation is imperative.
3. An Altered Outcome
The best example of a recent case that would turn out differently
under the approach outlined in this Article is Tracinda Corporation v.
DaimlerChrylser AG-a Third Circuit decision.174 In Tracinda, the
plaintiffs, a group of Chrysler shareholders, sued certain Daimler-
Chrysler executives and the DaimlerChrysler Corporation for alleged
fraud, misrepresentation, and other federal securities law violations
stemming from the 1998 merger of Daimler-Benz AG and Chrysler
Corporation.175
In Tracinda, the plaintiffs made their jury demand against the in-
dividual executives in a timely fashion early on in the litigation.176
Nonetheless, the defendants did not move to strike the jury demand
until approximately three years after Tracinda filed the demand. 177
The defendants filed the motion to strike the jury demand after the
close of discovery, approximately eight months after they filed their
summary-judgment motion, and only about six weeks prior to the
trial.178 The district court granted the motion to strike the jury de-
mand, despite the delay, finding that a broadly worded jury trial
waiver applied to the plaintiffs' claims against both the individual and
corporate defendants.179 The parties tried the case to the bench. 8 0
The district court decided in favor of the defendants and entered a
corresponding judgment.18
The plaintiffs appealed on several grounds, including the court's
decision to grant the motion to strike the jury demand. 8 2 They chal-
lenged the district court's finding on two points. First, the plaintiffs,
while conceding that a jury waiver provision applied to the corporate
defendants, argued that the jury waiver provision did not cover the
individual defendants.183 The Third Circuit rejected this argument.
It held that a valid contractual jury waiver provision, which applies to
a signatory corporation, also applies to a non-signatory officer acting
174. 502 F.3d 212 (3d Cir. 2007).
175. Id. at 220.
176. Id. at 226.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 221.
180. Id. at 220-21.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 221.
183. Id. at 221-25.
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as an agent of the signatory corporation.' 8 4 Second, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the district court should bar the motion to strike the jury
demand as untimely because of laches.18 5 They asserted that the de-
fendants committed inexcusable delay in waiting over three years un-
til very near the trial date to file the motion and that this delay caused
them undue prejudice.1 8 6 The plaintiffs claimed that they would have
conducted discovery differently had they known that there was a chal-
lenge to their jury demand. Because there was no challenge to their
jury demand, they prepared for trial with the idea that they would be
trying the case to the jury instead of the court.18 7 The Third Circuit
rejected these arguments as well. It followed the traditional view, ap-
plying Rule 39 and interpreting Rule 39 to state that a party may file
a motion to strike a jury demand at any time during the case.18 8
Therefore, the Tracinda court reasoned that because the defendants
filed the motion to strike in a timely fashion under the rule-even
though the motion was filed three years after the jury demand and
very close to the trial date-there was not inexcusably delay.18 9 And
because there was no inexcusable delay, the court stated that it did
not have to consider whether the defendants' delay caused prejudice to
the plaintiffs. 190
184. Id. at 225.
185. Id. at 226. Laches is an equitable defense, which is based on the concept that
equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. It is the "un-
reasonable delay in pursuing a right or claim ... in a way that prejudices the
party against whom relief is sought." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 891 (8th ed.
2004). The elements of a laches defense typically include: (1) inexcusable delay;
and (2) prejudice to the opposing party due to the delay. Santana Prods., Inc. v.
Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 138 (3d Cir. 2005); Rogers v. Ri-
cane Enter., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76, 80 (Tex. 1989).
186. Tracinda, 502 F.3d at 226.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 226-27.
189. Id. at 227.
190. Id. at 227. ("Because a party may file a motion to strike a jury demand at any
time under Rule 39(a), we conclude that DaimlerChrysler did not commit inex-
cusable delay by filing its motion to strike after the close of discovery. Having
reached this conclusion, we need not consider whether DaimlerChrysler's delay
caused prejudice to Tracinda.").
Despite the Trancinda court's statement that there was no need to consider
whether the delay caused prejudice to the plaintiffs, the court did do a cursory
prejudice analysis in a footnote and concluded that the plaintiffs were not
prejudiced because they already knew that the contractual jury waiver clause
applied to the corporate defendants. Id. at 227 n.16. This is a questionable anal-
ysis given that it depends on the further conclusion that there could be no jury
trial on the claims against the individual defendants. There was a jury trial right
on the claims against the individual defendants and assuming that right was
taken away by a jury waiver, the plaintiffs could justifiably have believed that
those claims would have to be tried to a jury, even though a jury waiver provision
covered the claims against the corporate defendants. Thus, the way in which the
plaintiffs prepared for trial on those individual claims could certainly have been
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Under the affirmative defense approach, the Tracinda case would
be decided differently. The defendants would be expected to plead the
jury waiver defense as an affirmative defense within twenty days of
the service of the jury demand. They would then be expected to file
the motion to strike the jury demand within the non-dispositive mo-
tion deadline. At the very least, they would be expected to raise the
issue in a court document in some fashion prior to the amended plead-
ings deadline in the case. The defendants' decision to wait until just a
few weeks before the trial date to raise the defense would render their
jury waiver defense waived. Like other affirmative defenses, a court
could consider whether to allow the jury waiver defense as a late af-
firmative defense even though the defense had already been waived.
However, in this instance, the Third Circuit should have disallowed
the defense because of the extreme nature of the delay and the likeli-
hood of prejudice to the plaintiffs. Moreover, it should have disal-
lowed the defense to penalize the defendants for failing to abide by
procedural rules and to reinforce the fundamental nature of the jury-
trial right. That right is closely guarded and will not be taken away
when the opposing party fails to follow procedural requirements.
V. CONCLUSION
The traditional application and interpretation of Rule 39 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to jury waivers is unwarranted. Rule
8(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should regulate the proce-
dural requirements for asserting and proving the contractual jury
waiver defense in federal court. This approach, while novel and as of
yet not applied by courts, should be adopted because it more fully com-
ports with the text of the rules and the policy goals in this area of the
law.
altered had the defendants given timely notice of their challenge to the jury de-
mand. Indeed, given the failure on the part of the defendants to file a motion to
strike the jury demand prior to the discovery deadline, there was certainly reason
to believe that the jury demand would be honored and the plaintiffs cannot be
faulted for taking steps in accordance with that reasonable belief.
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